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Abstract: This paper uses the archival records of three entities succes-
sively carrying on coal and ironmaking activities at Staveley between 
1838-1900, together with the findings from earlier research, to ex-
plore the costing information generated over the period 1690-1900. 
We find a system of cost accounting, broadly defined, in operation 
throughout the period, a large measure of continuity concerning its 
basic features, and innovations made from time to time presumably 
designed to improve its usefulness. The paper uses the results of this 
and earlier research to explore the nature of accounting change and 
draws attention to possible differences in the path of development 
between countries. Further, we assess the significance of our findings 
for present ideas concerning the development of cost accounting sys-
tems in Britain and the U.S., and argue for a broader view to be taken 
by researchers into the nature of management accounting's develop-
ment. 
A previous article [Edwards and Boyns, 1992] examined the 
accounting records of two vertically-integrated charcoal iron-
making enterprizes operating as partnerships in the Sheffield 
area between 1690-1783.1 The main findings were that their ac-
counting systems, each based on double entry bookkeeping, in-
volved complete integration of the cost and financial records, 
the identification of unit costs for raw material inputs, the use 
of accounting prices to record the movement of goods between 
locations in order to measure departmental results, and the cal-
culation of input-output yield statistics for raw materials and 
intermediary products. 
1
 These were The Duke of Norfolk's Works in south Yorkshire and the 
Derbyshi re and N o t t i n g h a m Company loca ted a r o u n d Staveley, n o r t h 
Derbyshire. 
Submitted June 1994 
Revised May 1995 
Accepted August 1995 
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The present paper uses the findings from this earlier re-
search together with the archival records of three entities2 (two 
sole traders and a quoted public company) subsequently carry-
ing on coal and ironmaking activities at Staveley, in succession, 
during the period 1838-1900 for the following purposes: 
* to contrast the nature of cost accounting developments in 
Britain and the U.S.; 
* to argue for a broader view to be taken of the development of 
managerial accounting than is implicit in the debate concern-
ing the significance of events at the Springfield Armory; 
* to outline and analyze the costing system in use at Staveley 
between 1838-1900; and 
* to assess the likely relevance of the data generated for the 
purposes of planning, measurement and control. 
INDUSTRIAL ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE U.S. AND BRITAIN 
There is a growing literature on the development of cost 
accounting and a keen interest in the extent to which failure to 
respond to changing circumstances during the twentieth century 
has caused it to lose its relevance [Johnson and Kaplan, 1987]. A 
feature of this literature is the debate concerning the way in 
which our knowledge of earlier developments can help to ex-
plain the nature and purpose of cost accounting and the process 
of evolution into its present day form. 
Much of the literature used as the basis for generalizing 
earlier developments in English-speaking countries, post-1800, 
deals with the activities of nineteenth century U.S. companies 
[Johnson, 1972; Chandler, 1977, 1990; Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1994; Tyson, 1990, 1992, 1993]. 
Particular importance is ascribed to events at the Springfield 
Armory. According to Chandler [1977, p. 72], "before the mid-
1830s the only industrial enterprises in the United States to have 
an internal sub-division as extensive as that of Adam Smith's 
famous pin factory were a small number of gun making estab-
lishments." Features of the most successful of these, the Spring-
field Armory, were that it had a workforce of 250 men and was, 
for decades, the largest metal working establishment in the 
country. Chandler therefore sees it as perfectly natural for "tech-
2
 The records for these companies are housed at the Derbyshire Record 
Office, Matlock, Derbyshire and the Sheffield City Library, archives department. 
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niques of modern factory management" to appear first in this 
"important prototype of the modern factory" [Ibid., pp. 72-3]. 
If we accept Chandler's view that the scope and scale of 
business activity is likely to have implications for the design and 
development of the management information system, we might 
expect to find differences between the U.S. and British experi-
ences. Of particular relevance is the fact that factory develop-
ment had begun somewhat earlier in Britain. Proto-industrial-
ization during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
had seen the emergence of the proto-factory,3 involving a signifi-
cant investment in tools and implements and a labor force as-
sembled to perform specialist functions under supervision 
[Flinn, 1962; Marshall, 1980, chapter 6; Mepham, 1988, pp. 57-
8]. 
The pace of industrialization picked up in Britain during 
the second half of the eighteenth century with the textile, espe-
cially cotton but also woolen, and iron industries coming to the 
fore. By 1812, in the neighborhood of Birmingham alone, there 
were 10 iron works, each of which cost over £50,000 to establish 
and typically engaged between 300-500 workmen apart from the 
colliers [Ashton, quoted in Edwards, 1937, p . 193]. An example 
of an organization growing rapidly during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, under the leadership of Sir John Guest, was 
the Dowlais Iron Company which employed 5,192 people in 
1842. In the same year, it was described as "the first [iron 
works] in the world,"4 but it is not necessary to go beyond the 
locality of south Wales for other examples of substantial British 
Companies at this early date.5 
3
 The first factory proper is generally considered to be John Lombe's silk-
throwing mill near Derby in 1717. It was 500 feet long and, with five or six 
stories resembled "a huge barracks . . . with its automatic tools, its continuous 
and unlimited production and the narrowly specialised functions of its [300] 
operatives" [Mantoux, 1928, p. 199]. 
4
 Letter from S. W. Roberts of Philadelphia to Thomas Evans, the overseas 
agent of Dowlais. Glamorgan Record Office, Dowlais main series letter book 
1842 (2) f. 368. 
5
 The Plymouth Iron Company employed 3,900, Tredegar 2,757, Rhymney 
2,494, Penydarren 2,071 and Blaenavon 1,971, while Cyfarthfa employed 2,000 
at the forges alone [Royal Commission on Childrens' Employment in Mines and 
Manufactories, 1842, Report of Rhys William Jones, Appendix, Part 2, p. 594]. 
The Report of the Commissioners for the State of the Population in the Mining 
Districts, 1846, puts employment at Dowlais at c. 6,000 and at Rhymney c. 4,000, 
of which 1,600 were employed in the mines. It is also stated that 1,700 were 
employed at Dowlais in the mines, but it is not clear whether this is part of the 
6,000. 
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Given Chandler's [1977, 1990] assessment of the impact of 
the large-scale business enterprize on cost accounting develop-
ments, it would be surprising if progress in this direction had 
not been made early on by companies at the forefront of 
Britain's Industrial Revolution. Indeed, research has been un-
dertaken which suggests that important costing developments 
did in fact occur in Britain both prior to and during the Indus-
trial Revolution [McKendrick, 1970; Stone, 1973; Jones, 1985; 
Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991, 1992; Fleischman, Parker 
and Vamplew, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Edwards and 
Boyns, 1992]. Moreover, refinements of accounting technique, 
of fundamental importance in terms of departmental profit and 
performance measurement occurred in relatively small iron 
making establishments [Edwards and Boyns, 1992]. 
This paper will present further evidence both explicit and 
suggestive of the fact that this material was used for manage-
ment purposes [see also Boyns and Edwards, 1995]. 
DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING — 
SOME SUGGESTIONS 
It has been persuasively argued that Johnson and Kaplan's 
analysis of the development of management accounting in Rel-
evance Lost [1987] has "placed accounting history centre-stage 
not only in the research agenda, but also for practical business 
management" [p. 36]. The result has been an upsurge of publica-
tions in this area and an intense and sometimes heated debate 
[Tyson, 1992; Fleischman, Kalbers and Parker, 1992; Miller and 
Napier, 1993; Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Tyson, 1995] between 
Foucauldians, Marxists and economic rationalists concerning 
the respective merits of different approaches to accounting his-
tory [Napier, 1989; Miller, Hopper and Laughlin 1991]. Calls 
have been made for recognition of possible merit in more than 
one approach towards analysing accounting's past [Fleischman, 
Kalbers and Parker, 1992], and the late eighteenth century ac-
counting practices of Boulton & Watt have been the subject of 
re-interpretation as the result of collaborative research between 
Foucauldians and an economic rationalist [Fleischman, Hoskin 
and Macve, 1995]. 
Recent years have also seen an interesting debate in the 
accounting history literature concerning the "genesis of man-
agerialism" [Hoskin and Macve, 1994]. According to Chandler, 
the necessary administrative co-ordination of emerging large-
scale companies during the nineteenth century was facilitated 
4
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by the adoption of bookkeeping procedures based on "standard 
double-entry accounts" [Chandler, 1977, pp. 73-4]. The Spring-
field Armory case is cited as an exemplar, with events during the 
stewardship of Colonel Roswell Lee (1815-33) seen to have been 
of crucial importance. 
Historians of a Foucauldian persuasion [Hoskin and Macve, 
1988] have challenged Chandler's "demand - response" explana-
tion for the development of managerialism during the 1830s and 
1840s. They agree that events at the U.S. Springfield Armory in 
the first half of the nineteenth century saw accounting play a 
full part in the development of "managerialism," but see a disci-
plinary power-knowledge framework as responsible for observed 
changes. In the opinion of Hoskin and Macve, identified events, 
which include the "West Point connection," conspired to pro-
duce "crucial discontinuities from previous accounting and 
management practices" [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, p. 38]. The 
major step forward comprised a new accountability based on "a 
full accounting for labour productivity" [Hoskin and Macve, 
1988, p. 38; see also Chandler, 1977, pp. 72-5]. In a later paper, 
Hoskin and Macve [1994] have demonstrated conclusively the 
fact that Springfield's accounting system under Lee was based 
on the stewardship-oriented charge/discharge accounting rather 
than, as Chandler believed, the potentially more commercially-
oriented double entry bookkeeping [1994, pp. 18-22], and have 
further argued that it was "a revolutionary time-and-motion 
study undertaken in 1831 which exposed the previously-hidden 
problem of slack, and thus made it possible to engineer the 
subsequent cost and productivity transformations" [1994, p. 6]. 
The time and motion study is thought to have been the "brain-
child" of Lieutenant Daniel Tyler, a West point graduate who 
joined Springfield in 1831. 
The Hoskin and Macve thesis has been challenged by Tyson 
[1990, 1992, 1993]. Tyson re-examined the Springfield archive 
and concluded that there was, potentially, a managerial ac-
counting system in place prior to Tyler joining the Armory, and 
that subsequent changes in the use of this accounting system 
can better be explained in terms of a range of identified eco-
nomic and social factors. Tyson's findings have been stoutly re-
sisted by Hoskin and Macve [1994] who re-assert their earlier 
conclusions. 
This debate is of relevance to our study for reasons which 
include assertions made by Foucauldians concerning the nature 
and purpose of costing systems uncovered by other academic 
5
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researchers. Earlier costing developments in U.S. textile mills 
are down-played due to their perceived inability to establish ef-
fective accountability in respect of workers and product ion 
[Hoskin and Macve, 1988, pp. 70-1]. More importantly, for our 
purposes, while Foucaudians have noted the introduction of 
cost accounting techniques in British companies before and dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution [McKendrick, 1970; Jones, 1985; 
Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Fleischman and 
Parker, 1990, 1991], the significance of these findings6 has been 
questioned [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1992] on the grounds that 
they provide evidence of cost finding but not cost control. 
We use the findings from recent research into the Staveley 
archives together with our investigation of its predecessor com-
panies [Edwards and Boyns, 1992] to question this conclusion. 
We think that progress in management accounting history re-
search needs to pay more attention to two factors, of which the 
second is given particular emphasis in this paper. First, there is 
a need to consider the possible significance of differences in 
environmental circumstances between countries. For example, it 
is plausible to argue that a country with a long industrial history 
and steady rate of economic development in circumstances 
where labor was relatively plentiful (e.g., Britain between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries) is likely to exhibit signifi-
cant differences in the development of its technologies, includ-
ing accounting, compared with a country which started much 
later but then industrialized more rapidly against a background 
of labor shortages (e.g., the U.S.). 
Second, while we share with Hoskin, Macve and Tyson a 
concern with the development of accounting as a tool for man-
agement, we argue that it is a mistake to focus overmuch on 
"using accounting information to exert human accountability, 
e.g., by eradicat ing slack and increasing work efficiency" 
[Hoskin and Macve, 1994, p . 7, emphasis added]. The material 
presented and commented on in the remainder of this paper 
contains little or no evidence of an accounting system being 
used principally as a means of surveillance of the workforce. 
However, we argue that a broader view needs to be taken of the 
possible nature and role of accounting systems both within and 
between countries. That is, we suggest that management was 
concerned to make the best use of available resources within 
certain constraints, of which one may have been a recognition 
6
 Also, in the U.S. context, Porter, 1980. 
6
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of the need to maintain harmonious management/worker rela-
tions in a period when the "governable person" [Miller and 
O'Leary, 1987] had not yet been created, at least in the private 
sector. We therefore take the view that it is unduly restrictive to 
equate the development of managerial accounting with the 
growth of scientific management, which is seen to have its ori-
gins at West Point and to have been popularized by Frederick 
Taylor in the late nineteenth century. Rather, we take as a refer-
ence point the definition of management accounting which ap-
peared in the report prepared by the team which visited the 
U.S.A. in 1950 under the auspices of the then recently estab-
lished Anglo-American Council on Productivity. It is the first 
such definition of which we are aware that has appeared in the 
British accounting literature. 
Management accountancy is the presentation of ac-
counting information in such a way as to assist man-
agement in the creation of policy and in the day-to-day 
operation of an undertaking (1950, p. viii). 
We recognize that we focus on a term "management account-
ing" which was not even used in the nineteenth century, but we 
do not see this as a problem.7 Our sole purpose is to discover 
whether the system we have researched meets the basic criterion 
subsequently articulated as justifying that designation.8 
In the next two sections, we present our analysis of the 
system of accounting used at Staveley between 1838-1900. In the 
final section, we emphasize the gradual evolution, over two cen-
turies, of an accounting system which (our investigations of ar-
chives elsewhere suggest9) had many features in common with 
that in widespread use among iron, steel and coal companies in 
the late nineteenth century. Also, we make a tentative assess-
ment, based on the limited explicit evidence available, of the 
extent to which this system can be regarded as serving manage-
7
 See Miller and Napier [1993] for a different view 
8
 In this context, we note a broad similarity between the 1950 definition and 
those used by today's management accounting textbooks. 
9Bolckow, Vaughan and Company Ltd, Cleveland (British Steel, North East-
ern Regional Records Centre); Consett Iron Company Ltd, Durham (British 
Steel, Nor th Eas tern Regional Records Centre); Dowlais I ron Company, 
Glamorgan (Glamorgan Record Office); Pearson and Knowles Coal and Iron 
Company Ltd, Lancashire (British Steel, North Western Regional Records Cen-
tre); Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal Company Ltd, Staffordshire (British Steel, 
North Western Regional Records Centre); and South Durham Steel and Iron 
Company Ltd, Durham (British Steel, North Eastern Regional Records Centre). 
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ment's informational requirements. We acknowledge the lack of 
surviving evidence to demonstrate the precise use made of this 
accounting information and refer to the contemporary literature 
for illumination on this matter. In the final section we also com-
ment further on the process of accounting change in different 
countries and argue for a broad view of management account-
ing to be taken by researchers into its history. 
THE INTEGRATED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
1838-41: Staveley Works — George Barrow, Sole Proprietor 
In 1783, at the end of a 21-year lease, the tenancy of Joseph 
Clay (managing clerk of The Duke of Norfolk's Works and the 
Derbyshire and Nottingham Company) was not renewed and the 
two partnerships were dissolved. Staveley was then leased to 
Walter Mather who belonged to a group of capitalists that also 
controlled foundries and mills in south Derbyshire. In the en-
deavor to improve profitability, the furnace was re-built to en-
able the use of coke instead of charcoal as its ma in fuel 
[Hopkinson, 1957, p. 117]. Following Mather's death in 1796, 
Staveley was bequeathed to his sons-in-law, William Ward and 
Edward Richard Lowe, though the latter died in 1800 and his 
widow continued in partnership with Ward. 
In 1805, Lowe's widow marr ied George H. Barrow, a 
Southwell solicitor, who initially took little interest in Staveley. 
Bad management and a run of losses from circa 1810 encour-
aged Barrow to become more involved and, in 1815, he took 
over the ground leases and assumed sole responsibility for the 
works. George continued to run the business until 1841, by 
which time backward integration had secured supplies of iron-
stone and coal from local pits and collieries. 
The single accounting record which appears to have sur-
vived from George's proprietorship is the double entry-based 
private ledger for 1838-41 [D3808]. Nevertheless, the wealth of 
physical and financial information it contains enables us to con-
struct a fairly clear picture of the nature of business operations 
at this time, the flow of goods between operating departments 
and stock, and the way in which costs and profits were mea-
sured [Figure 1]. 
8
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FIGURE 1 
Staveley Works, departments and cost/revenue flows, 
1838-41 
Small amounts of castings were supplied and recharged to other departments 
in the form of items such as rails, wagon wheels, punches, plates, pram 
wheels, point plates, pipes, pulley wheels, washers, drum wheels and doors. 
> Transfers at cost 
> Transfers at an accounting price 
(1) Separate columns in these ledger accounts list physical quantities trans-
ferred to the next stage of operations. 
(2) Separate columns in these ledger accounts list physical quantities for both 
inflows and outflows. 
Source: Private ledger of Staveley Works, 1838-41. 
Ironstone 
pits (1) 
Ironstone 
stock (2) 
Collieries (1) 
Limestone 
stock (2) 
Coke 
ovens(2) 
Furnaces (1) 
Pig iron 
stock (2) 
Foundry (1) 
Castings 
stock (2)* 
Customer 
* 
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The main operating departments (each of which was allo-
cated a separate ledger account) consisted of three collieries, an 
unspecified number of ironstone pits and coke ovens, two fur-
naces and a foundry. There were also separate ledger accounts 
for stocks of limestone (purchased externally and subsequently 
transferred to the furnaces), ironstone (obtained from the pits 
and used in the furnaces), pig iron (produced by the furnaces 
and transferred to the foundry or sold) and castings (produced 
in the foundry for subsequent sale). Coal was transferred from 
the collieries to the coke ovens, furnaces, foundry and custom-
ers. 
The unbroken arrows in Figure 1 indicate transfers to cus-
tomers at selling price and to other operating departments at 
accounting prices, subject to periodic adjustment, which were 
usually below market price. The outcome was an accounting 
system which produced profit or loss measures for each of the 
operating departments which interfaced either partly (collieries 
producing coal and furnaces producing pig iron) or wholly 
(foundry producing castings) with the market. The costs in-
curred by the ironstone pits were re-charged monthly to the 
ironstone stock account, while the cost of coal transferred to the 
coke ovens was, in turn, re-charged monthly to the furnaces 
accounts and the foundry account based on their respective us-
age. The ironstone stock and limestone stock were each re-
charged to the furnaces at accounting prices, again subject to 
periodic adjustment. In these cases, however, it seems that the 
transfer prices were designed to recover the cost with any under 
or over-recovery, so far as we can judge, affecting the valuation 
of closing stock which was inserted as the balancing figure. 
Each of the ledger accounts contains figures for physical 
inputs [Figure 1, notes 1 and 2], while each of the stock ac-
counts also contains figures for physical outputs [Figure 1, note 
2]. The reconciliation of physical quantities helped to prove the 
completeness of the record,10 identified deficiencies which could 
be judged acceptable or otherwise, and provided the data which 
10
 The exception is in the case of the coke ovens where the actual coke 
produced weighed substantially less than the coal consumed. For example, the 
charge to the furnaces for November 1848 shows that 549 tons 19 cwts of coal 
produced 329 tons 19 cwts 1 quarter of coke. These figures are closely in line 
with the expected input-output ratio of 60% [Gibson, 1922, p. 77], and we specu-
late that the numbers generated by the accounting system were compared with 
this kind of yardstick. 
10
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we imagine were used to calculate yields.11 The continuity in the 
accounting system over time is worth noting. Between 1690-
1783, the outputs of operating departments which interfaced 
partly with the market were also valued at accounting prices (at 
that time closer to market price than seems to have been the 
case between 1838-41), while other transfers, such as ironstone 
(purchased) and charcoal (produced) , were made at cost 
[Edwards and Boyns, 1992, pp. 160-3]. Table 112 lists depart-
mental results achieved at the main profit centers, together with 
those of the farm, brickyard, lime kiln, and on the meat account. 
TABLE 1 
Balances of profit and (loss) extracted 
from private ledger 1838-41. 
Pig iron 
Castings 
Collieries 
Hollingwood 
Norbriggs 
Staveley 
Norbriggs New 
Other 
Farm 
Meat account 
Brickyard 
Lime kiln 
April 1838/ 
March 1839 
£ 
4,893.9. 8 
3,368. 7.10 
1,676. 1. 8 
10.10.10 
751.13. 4 
(138.19. 4) 
122. 4. 3 
** 
** 
April 1839/ 
March 1840 
£ 
3,669.15. 5 
2,676. 9. 1 
1,577.19. 1 
(206. 2. 4) 
550.12. 5 
(146. 1. 5) 
(131. 4. 6) 
(10. 8. 3) 
20.19. 0 
43.12. 0 
April 1840/ 
March 1841 
£ 
3,888. 5. 9 
454.16. 8 
836. 5. 1 
(121. 8.11) 
(173.19.11) 
(181. 5. 4) 
* 
* 
* 
April 1841/ 
December 1841 
£ 
643.11. 2 
(50. 5. 8) 
62.17. 3 
(139. 3. 1) 
196. 18. 6 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* Ledger accounts not written up for these years. 
** Ledger accounts not balanced this year 
Source: Private ledger, 1838-41 [D3808]. 
11
 We have evidence to show that they were made in earlier times at Staveley 
[Edwards and Boyns, 1992, pp. 166-7] and also later (see below). 
12
 The contents of Table 1 reflect the fact that not all the ledger accounts 
were written up and/or balanced between 1838-41, with the situation worsening 
towards the end of George's proprietorship. Elsewhere in the ledger we find 
material amounts of expenditure on fixed assets recorded in accounts which 
were not balanced until the ledger was closed. For example, there is a Staveley 
New Colliery Account and a New Furnace Account which, respectively, show 
accumulated debit balances of £1,729. 17. 7 and £1,068. 16. 8. [D3808, Private 
Ledger, 1838-41]. These omissions are suggestive of the fact that neither a trial 
balance was extracted nor final accounts prepared for the years 1838-41. 
11
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We can therefore conclude that the ledger provided a fully 
integrated13 record of financial and costing information. At 
Staveley, the recognition of differential roles for cost and finan-
cial records was yet to arrive. The system of double entry book-
keeping had been modified and extended to meet changing busi-
ness r equ i rements , and we can conclude tha t the ledger 
remained the center-piece of the accounting system that could 
be directly consulted for both the financial and physical data 
required to inform assessments of the firm's profits, perfor-
mance and financial position. 
1841-63: Staveley Works — Richard Barrow, Sole Proprietor 
Following a successful re-negotiation of the lease14 in 
1841, George transferred control of the Staveley Works to his 
younger brother, Richard, who had been a "successful merchant 
in the China trade [and] who made a second career in coal and 
iron, using his mercantile fortune to exploit the potential of 
railway development" [Chapman, 1985, p . 123]. 
For this period the series of private ledgers are supported by 
journals and cash books. There is also a Capital Account Book, 
1841-65 and a Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808] which con-
tain final accounts and related working papers. The system of 
double entry bookkeeping appears to have been the same as 
before; certainly the private ledgers were maintained on broadly 
the same basis. However, modifications and improvements were 
made from time to time in the system of record keeping. Also, 
for this period, there has survived data generated outside the 
ledger suitable for the purpose of assessing performance. 
1841 innovations: Following the change in ownership, certain 
alterations were immediately made to the system of record keep-
ing, principal among which was that limestone stock15 and the 
ironstone pits each became profit centers [D3808, Private Led-
13
 Much of the discussion of the integration of cost and financial accounting 
systems, beginning in the 1890s [e.g., Mann, 1891, pp. 631-2], focuses on the 
need to reconcile, periodically, separate systems, or to ensure their correspon-
dence through the use of control accounts. The Staveley archive draws our 
attention to the possibility that, in certain industries at least, a single set of 
books was initially used to meet differential information requirements. 
14
 The property belonged to the Duke of Devonshire. 
15
 It is possible that the balancing amounts (credit and debit) were under or 
over-recoveries of cost rather than profits or losses, but this seems unlikely in 
view of the magnitudes of the amounts involved. 
12
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ger, 1841-47]. A further refinement to departmental profit mea-
surement resulted from the decision to re-charge the furnace 
and credit the foundry "for blast," with the amount put at £100 
for 1844. 
The survival of journals for the period post-1841 enables us 
to examine more carefully the transfer prices used at Staveley.16 
For example: 
* Coal: Journal entries for November 1848 [D3808, Journal, 
1847-49, fo. 121] show that credit sales and "ready money" 
sales of hard coal were each made at 6s. for larger quantities 
and 7s. for smaller quantities. This type of coal was re-
charged to the "railway sales account" (a new profit center17) 
and the furnaces at 5s. Soft coal was charged to the railway 
sales account and the foundry at 4s., and this amount also 
obtained for cash and credit sales, although 5s. was received 
for one small quantity of credit sales. Cobbles were charged at 
4s. to the new furnace and the railway sales account, but 
produced 5s. from cash and credit sales. Slack was charged at 
1s. to the new and old furnaces, but realized 2s. in cash and 
credit sales. 
* Pig iron stock: Journal entries for January 1848 [D3808, Jour-
nal, 1847-49, fo. 36] show pig iron stock charged to the 
foundry at £4 per ton while fetching £5. 15. 0 per ton in the 
market. In April 1849 [fos. 166 & 171], the transfer price was 
£3. 10. 0 at a time when the Barrow could get £5. 10. 0 for 
sales to customers. 
We can therefore see that the transfer prices for coal and 
iron were, at this stage, significantly below market price. It 
therefore remains a matter of conjecture whether this discount 
was designed to reflect the fact that a company (buying in bulk) 
could purchase coal and iron at much less than it could sell 
them, or whether management made a conscious decision to 
16
 An examination of the accounting records of ten coal, iron and steel pro-
ducers in the late nineteenth century has shown them all to employ systems of 
transfer pricing though with considerable variety in the methods used to make 
the calculations. It does not seem to have been a matter which received much 
attention in the early literature, and the first publication we are aware of which 
deals specifically with this topic is Brady [1930]. 
17
 We surmise that this term describes coal transferred to customers by rail 
rather than used at the works or sold locally. This profit center was discontinued 
in the 1860s when the entire coal profits came to be reported under the names of 
the separate collieries. 
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subsidize furnace production (where coal was the major input), 
foundry production (coal and pig iron) and railway sales (coal). 
1847 innovations: The first set of final accounts for the new 
firm was made up to June 30, 1847 [D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 
1841-63] six years after the commencement of Richard Barrow's 
stewardship. The accounts comprise a balance sheet setting out 
the financial position at that date and a "Statement of Profit and 
Loss" covering each of the six years since formation. The first 
balance sheet shows Richard Barrow's capital investment at 
£116,297. The profit and loss account was produced in what was 
at this time a familiar format in the iron industry. It lists profits 
or losses arising at each profit center which included, for 1847, 
five collieries, several ironstone pits, several coke ovens, two 
foundries; two furnaces, the farm, a brickyard and railway coal 
sales. The final accounts did not reveal the calculation (costs 
and revenues) of departmental profits and losses and it was 
therefore necessary to refer to the ledger for this information. 
An interesting feature of these accounts is the computation 
of charges for depreciation and imputed interest on the capital 
invested in fixed assets used by each profit center.18 These were 
then deducted from the balances for each profit center (profit or 
loss) extracted from the ledger, and the outcome was a series of 
departmental results which take account of both the decline in 
value of fixed assets and the opportunity cost to Barrow of in-
vesting in the Staveley enterprize.19 The depreciation rates range 
from 5%-10% on individual assets, which is probably explicable 
in terms of differential estimates of useful life. The imputed 
rates of interest varied from 3.5%-5%. These were roughly in 
line with central government interest rates20 though we are un-
able to explain why different rates were used for different as-
sets.21 
18
 The detailed calculations were set out in the working papers under the 
heading "Statement of Capital, Interest and Depreciation Accounts" [D3808, Bal-
ance Sheet Book, 1841-63]. 
19
 The inclusion of an interest charge when appraising capital investment 
proposals was quite common at this time but the imputation of interest in post-
fact accounts was rare [Edwards, 1989, p. 312]. 
20The yield on government consolidated stock was 3.4% in 1847 and the 
bank rate 5% at the end of the year. 
21
 The credit entries for accumulated profit, accumulated depreciation and 
interest charged to date were, in the balance sheet, added to the figure for 
Barrow's original capital investment. Also noteworthy is the use of the term 
"realised" profit for the purpose of describing the figure for profit transferred 
14
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1856 innovations: The business was expanded to a significant 
extent during the 1850s as a result of opening up the Speedwell 
and Springwell Collieries. The surviving records show that a 
number of important changes were made at this stage to the 
accounting system. 
Using the accounts for 1860 for illustration purposes 
[D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63], we find that the main 
profit centers consisted of two ironstone pits, three collieries, 
the pig iron department, the castings department, and the rail-
way coal sales [Table 2]. The entire output of the two ironstone 
pits, 26,745 tons, was consumed in the production of pig iron. 
The total output of the three collieries amounted to 298,816 
tons, of which 29,763 tons was consumed in pig iron production 
and 4,089 tons by the castings department. The balance was 
available for sale. The entire output of the pig iron department, 
12,118 tons, was transferred to the castings department. 
TABLE 2 
Output, costs, revenues and profits, year to June 30 1860 
Operating 
Departments 
Coal 
Victoria 
Speedwell 
Springwell 
Ironstone 
Staveley 
Hady 
Pig Iron 
Castings 
Railway 
Coal Sales 
Output 
tons 
119,708 
68,391 
110.717 
298.816 
15,778 
10.967 
26.745 
12,118 
16,118 
337,140 
< 
Cost 
s. d 
4s. 5¼ 
5s. 7¼ 
3S.10¼ 
13s.4¼ 
15s.9½ 
64s.7¼ 
99s.5¾ 
Per Ton Statistics 
Receipts 
s. d 
5s.11½ 
5s. 5¾ 
5s. 5¼ 
62s 
123s.11½ 
Profit 
s. d 
1s.6¼ 
(1½) 
1s.7 
24s.5¾ 
Estab-
lishment 
d 
8¼ 
8¼ 
8¼ 
4S.0 
> 
Net 
Profit 
s. d 
10 
(9¾) 
10¾ 
2s.7¼ 
20s.5¾ 
8½ 
Notes: 'Profit' figure is equivalent to contribution. 
For 'railway coal sales', only figures for total output and net profit per 
ton are given. 
Source: Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808]. 
annually to the balance sheet, while a memorandum entry at the foot of the 
general profit and loss account adds back the charges for interest and deprecia-
tion to "realised" profit to give a figure captioned "total" profit. 
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In 1860, the accounting prices used to track transfers of 
goods between departments were as follows: the pig iron depart-
ment was charged at the rate of 6s per ton for hard coal and 5s 
per ton for cobbles, while the castings department was charged 
at 5s per ton for coal, presumably of a different type from that 
used in the iron department. The entire output of the pig iron 
department was priced at 62s per ton, which we know was the 
prevailing market price as the castings account shows that an 
additional 5,120 tons of iron were purchased from outside at 
this figure. The figure for revenue in the colliery accounts is 
described as "sales and consumption," indicating the dual desti-
nation of the coal for use within the company and transfer to 
the "railway coal sales" account. Coke was charged to the cast-
ings department at 21s per ton, which may have been the aver-
age cost of production in view of the very small balances trans-
ferred from the coke account to the general profit and loss 
account at the end of the accounting period. 
TABLE 3: 
Apportionment of Establishment Charges 
Establishment 
charge 
Railway wagon 
repairs 
Salaries 
Railway repairs 
Loco. repairs 
Rates and taxes 
Books, stationery 
stamps etc 
Manufactory 
Gas Works 
Law expenses 
Schools 
Donations 
Cart Roads 
Water Works 
Proportion 
for 
collieries 
£ 
3,090 
1,545 
2,683 
1,348 
224 
814 
365 
618 
126 
168 
14 
421 
£11,421 
s 
9 
4 
1 
11 
15 
15 
4 
15 
8 
11 
0 
8 
5 
d 
0 
6 
5 
2 
3 
1 
8 
1 
4 
4 
11 
4 
1 
Proportion 
for 
castings 
£ 
671 
687 
340 
591 
301 
41 
176 
87 
179 
31 
30 
4 
92 
3,237 
s 
2 
19 
4 
15 
19 
16 
14 
3 
1 
4 
16 
4 
18 
1 
d 
2 
6 
1 
8 
8 
7 
9 
8 
8 
1 
8 
10 
0 
4 
Proportion 
for rail 
coal a/c 
£ s d 
3,020 4 3 
3,020 4 3 
1860 
Total 
£ 
3,691 
3,778 
1,885 
3,274 
1,650 
266 
991 
452 
797 
157 
199 
18 
514 
17,678 
s 
6 
8 
8 
17 
10 
11 
9 
8 
16 
12 
8 
5 
6 
10 
d 
5 
6 
7 
1 
10 
10 
10 
4 
9 
5 
0 
9 
4 
8 
Source: Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808]. 
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The post-1856 accounting system so far described was 
much the same as its predecessor except that the transfer prices 
were closer to market than had been the case between 1838-47. 
It also contains four important innovations. The first concerns 
the treatment of joint costs. A number of entries for overheads, 
which had previously been debited to the general profit and loss 
account for the entire business and not traced to individual 
profit centers, were now entered on a separate schedule headed 
"Establishment Charges."22 Table 3 shows that the establishment 
charges (which cover some overheads of a general character as 
well as those clearly associated with production) were then allo-
cated between the "proportion for collieries" and "proportion for 
castings" (foundries); i. e., nothing was charged to the ironstone 
pits whose entire output, at this time, was transferred to the pig 
iron department (furnaces) or to the pig iron department whose 
entire output was transferred to the castings department (found-
ries) [see Table 2]. The method of appor t ionment between 
collieries and castings is not clear and varies from 3.5:1 to 5.6:1 
for individual items. 
22
 Interestingly, some of these entries previously appeared in the profit and 
loss account as credit as well as debit entries, indicating that at least some of the 
activities measured were treated as profit centers themselves, with production 
profit centers re-charged for the services they received. 
17
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TABLE 4 
Cost of getting coal 
Half year ending June 1856 
Staveley Hollingwood Victoria Springwell 
Wages, viz 
Bank 
Carpenters, smiths etc 
Carters, labourers 
Enginemen, firemen 
Hanging on, bank & 
weighing 
Leading & stacking 
Underground 
Getting, including 
head in stalls 
Putting 
Heading 
Horsekeepers & 
horse drivers 
Engine plane 
Switchkeepers & incline 
Ventilators, airways 
furnace etc 
New roads, airways 
Road repairs, road 
& nightmen 
Overmen, foremen & 
deputies 
Total wages 
Materials & Wages, viz 
Pit waggons & repairs 
Pit timber 
Metal punchions 
Stat. eng: & pump 
repairs: & pumps 
Stores, oil, ropes 
nails, candles etc 
tons 
44846 
1½ 
½ 
½ 
3¼ 
2½ 
2 / 1 
-
1 
1¼ 
2 
l¼ 
1 
1 
1¾ 
½ 
2¼ 
1½ 
¼ 
2 
2½ 
Pit horses & horsekeeping 2¼ 
Pit rails 
Wrought up iron 
Castings 
Carting 
Rent of land & 
surface damages 
N.Marriott's men, 
stone, bricks etc 
¼ 
¼ 
¼ 
-
¼ 
¼ 
tons 
31586 
8¼ 
2 / 1 0 ¾ 
3/7 
1/-
1¼ 
1¼ 
¾ 
3½ 
5½ 
2/5½ 
-
4¾ 
1¼ 
3¼ 
2½ 
2¾ 
8¾ 
3½ 
1 
2¼ 
2½ 
2¼ 
2 
7 
5¼ 
3½ 
1½ 
½ 
-
¼ 
4¼ 
1/0¼ 
4 / 9 ¼ 
5 / 9 ½ 
2 / 7 ¼ 
tons 
9918 
2¼ 
¾ 
2¼ 
4 
7 
3 / -
-
-
2½ 
-
5 
4½ 
-
8¼ 
1 
2¼ 
8¼ 
-
2 
4½ 
8¾ 
¾ 
1 
½ 
-
¼ 
1¼ 
1/4¼ 
4 / 9 ¼ 
6/1½ 
2 / 5 ½ 
tons 
26973 
2¼ 
2¾ 
¾ 
3 
8½ 
2 / 0 ¼ 
5¼ 
7¾ 
3¼ 
-
1¼ 
2¾ 
6 
6½ 
1¾ 
2¼ 
5 
1¾ 
2 
5½ 
6½ 
2½ 
1½ 
¾ 
-
¼ 
4 
1/5¼ 
4/11¼ 
6 / 4 ½ 
2/8 
18
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TABLE 4 
Cost of getting coal 
(Continued) 
Proportion of Establishment 
Charges 
Railway Wagon Repairs 
Supers' & clerk's salaries 
Railway repairs 
Locomotive department 
Rates & taxes 
Team Labour & 
horse-keeping 
Books stationery, 
stamps etc 
Manufactory repairs 
of machinery etc 
Gas Works, coal & wages 
Law expenses 
Stores, undivided 
balance of account 
Hollingwood boat level 
Donations 
Schools 
Royalty 
Current Cost 
Interest on capital 
Depreciation of capital 
Total Cost including 
2¼ 
2½ 
1¾ 
2 
¾ 
½ 
½ 
½ 
¼ 
½ 
¼ 
¼ 
-
-
interest and depreciation 
1/-
5 
6/-
2 
6/2 
2¼ 
2½ 
1¾ 
2 
¾ 
½ 
½ 
½ 
¼ 
½ 
¼ 
¼ 
-
- 1/-
2¼ 
9/7 
9½ 
1/7 
11/11½ 
2¼ 
2½ 
1¾ 
2 
¾ 
½ 
½ 
½ 
¼ 
½ 
¼ 
¼ 
-
- 1/-
3¾ 
9/10¾ 
1/8½ 
3/5¼ 
15/0½ 
2¼ 
2½ 
1¾ 
2 
¾ 
½ 
½ 
½ 
¼ 
½ 
¼ 
¼ 
-
- 1/-
2¼ 
10/2¾ 
7 
½ 
11/11¾ 
Source: Foundry Statements and Returns Book, 1856-79 [D3808] 
Second, the journal and the ledger henceforth contain much 
less detail than was previously the case [D3808, Private Ledger, 
1856-63; Journal, 1856-59]. The ledger accounts contain no 
physical quantities and, in the main, transfers between depart-
ments were made just once a year.23 Therefore, whereas prior to 
1856 it was possible to find out a great deal about business 
operations from a perusal of the ledger, the informational con-
tent is much reduced thereafter. 
23
 For example, in 1860 there was a single transfer from foundries to castings 
on June 30 of £25,317. 12. 11 [D3808, Private Ledger, 1856-63]. 
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The third important change was the introduction of the 
Foundry Statements and Returns Book [D3808] which ran 
through from 1856 to 1879. This document contains the physi-
cal data previously available in the ledger, and also a significant 
amount of new material including comparative statements, for 
similar activities and/or consecutive time periods, usually pre-
pared on a half-yearly basis. The tabular presentation used is 
illustrated in Table 4 which sets out the cost of getting coal at 
four of the company's mines in the first half of 1856. It provides 
cost per ton statistics for each item of input together with sub-
totals for "Bank Wages," "Underground Wages," "Materials & 
Wages," and the "Proportion of Establishment Charges". This 
tabular format was also used for the purpose of summarizing 
the overall results of individual departments [see Table 2]. From 
1856, the annual accounts also contain, for each department, 
full details of costs and revenues. It seems likely that average 
unit cost figures for production inputs contained in the Foundry 
Statements and Returns Book were prepared by dividing the 
total cost of each item appearing in the ledger and dividing them 
by separately recorded totals for physical output. The emphasis 
on physical as well as financial measures is implicit in the range 
of additional statements24 generated at Staveley on a routine six-
monthly basis.25 
The Foundry Statements and Returns Book, together with 
the analyzed final accounts, therefore provide a clear picture of 
both the nature of business operations and the financial inter-
pretation of these activities suitable for the purpose of identify-
ing waste and inefficiency (by comparing performance over 
time), assessing the comparative performance of different de-
partments producing similar products, and measuring the con-
tribution of each department to overall profit. 
24
 These were: the get, sales and consumption of coal; cost of getting iron-
stone; cost of calcining ironstone; loss of weight on calcining ironstone; sales 
and consumption of coke; cost of making coke; cost of making pig iron; average 
cost of all descriptions of castings. 
25
 Examples of ad hoc statements prepared to keep management informed of 
financial developments include: "Cost of the Construction of Lady View Engine" 
[fo. 23]; "Cost of Making Brasses for Railway Wagons, Engine uses [1856-64]" 
[fo. 193]; "Cost of Horsekeeping and Cart Repairs [1856-64]" [fo. 194]; "Sum-
mary of Expenditure on New Works from July 1st 1863 to June 30th 1876" [fos. 
149-50]; "Statement of Capital [expenditure] and Depreciation to 30th June 1876 
[1869-1876]" [fo. 151]; "Statement of Amounts set aside Yearly for Depreciation 
[1869-76]" [fo. 152]. 
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The fourth and final change involved the removal of depre-
ciation and interest charges from the final accounts. However, 
these items continued to be included in the calculations of cost 
contained in the Foundry Statements and Returns Book [Table 
4]. Table 4 shows that the term "Current cost" was used to 
describe the aggregate of the following costs, using coal for illus-
tration purposes — wages, materials, establishment charges and 
royalty. The term "Total Cost" was used to describe current cost 
plus depreciation and imputed interest on capital employed. We 
can therefore see that information was made available which 
would have enabled Barrow to assess whether the total cost of 
individual operations was covered by selling price. 
1863-1900: The Staveley Coal & Iron Company, Ltd 
Richard Barrow, having significantly extended the coal and iron 
making operations, in old age with no heirs, sold the business to 
a group of Manchester businessmen headed by Henry Davis 
Pochin. The Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd was incorpo-
rated to acquire the assets of Barrow's firm with effect from July 
1, 1863.2 6 The wel l -known Vic to r i an a c c o u n t a n t s David 
Chadwick [Cottrell, 1984] and James Edward Coleman [Jones, 
1988, p. 214] were involved in the promotion of the company 
and in entering the originating transactions in the books of ac-
count. The firm, Chadwick, Collier & Co., was appointed auditor 
and Richard Barrow stayed on as chairman of the new company 
until his death in 1865. 
The company was reasonably profitable during the first 
nine years of operations, very profitable between 1872-75, but 
profits then declined and were poor for a long period extending 
from 1878 to 1889. The early 1890s were again highly profitable, 
the mid-1890s a period of depression, followed by recovery 
which led to high profits by the turn of the century. 
There was a considerable expansion of activities in the years 
26
 The purchase price was fixed at £491,824, satisfied by the issue of share 
capital amounting to £100,000 and the balance by installments, including inter-
est, over the next six years. In line with the usual practice in Britain, during the 
late nineteenth century, industrial capital (in this case £285,000) was raised 
locally, mainly from the cities of Sheffield and Manchester. The new company 
was quoted on the Sheffield Stock Exchange from 1873, later also on the 
Manchester and Liverpool exchanges, and from 1899 on the London Stock Ex-
change. 
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up to the end of the century,27 but the broad organization of 
business operations and the way these were reflected in the ac-
counting system remained unchanged. Indeed, certain books, 
including the Foundry Statements and Returns Book 1856-1879, 
were in use for the period spanning incorporat ion.2 8 The 
company's cost accounting practices continued to exhibit strong 
evidence of continuity, with changes periodically made presum-
ably in an endeavor to ensure that the system matched perceived 
business needs. 
One important modification was the re-introduction of a 
depreciation charge to the annual accounts which were now 
also prepared for external use, with the maintenance of capital 
being a major preoccupation of the directors throughout the 
remaining period covered by this paper [Edwards and Boyns, 
1994, pp. 1163-67]. However, the practice of making notional 
charges for interest and depreciation at cost and profit center 
level was discont inued. The analysis of the es tabl ishment 
charges between departments interfacing wholly or partly with 
the market continued to be carefully carried out, with the basis 
of cost apportionment now clearer. 
In 1870, for example [D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 1863-93], 
most establishment charges (salaries, books, stationery and 
stamps, law expenses, incidental expenses — save for a small 
amount charged directly to North Staveley Colliery — and trav-
elling expenses) were apportioned between Staveley Collieries, 
North Staveley Colliery, and the Castings department on a per 
ton basis.29 The tonnages were calculated as follows: for the 
27Between 1860 (figures in parenthesis) and 1900, production (tons, round 
thousand) increased as follows: l imestone 43,000 (7,000); coal 1,800,000 
(299,000), pig iron 132,000 (12,000); and castings 69,000 (16,000) [Staveley 
Works balance sheet books 1841/2-1862/3; Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd.: 
detailed balance sheets 1893/4-1922/23]. 
28
 A minor change was to allocate the "establishment charges" to profit cen-
ters within the ledger so that the balance in the ledger for, say, Hollingwood and 
New Hollingwood collieries was after deducting establishment charges which 
were, for example, £12,144. 16. 5 in 1870. 
29
 This basis was also used for railway repairs, schools, donations, water 
works, and workmen's hall, although in these cases the apportionment was only 
among the Staveley Collieries and the Castings department, implying that the 
North Staveley Colliery did not benefit from any of these expenditures. Rates 
and taxes for the North Staveley Collieries, which were presumably in a geo-
graphically separate location, were separately identified, whereas the amount for 
the Staveley Collieries and castings was again apportioned between each pit on a 
per ton basis. The costs of the manufactory and gasworks were apportioned 
22
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collieries — their output; for castings, — the amount of iron-
stone, limestone and sand used to produce pig iron and castings, 
plus the output of the pig iron and castings departments. The 
logic underlying these apport ionments is that establishment 
costs were a function of throughput and that inputs and outputs 
should be counted in only one department, so that all coal out-
put was counted only in the collieries. 
The approach remained broadly the same at the next 
decenniel date (1880) but there were some significant modifica-
tions. The total amount allocated to the castings and pig iron 
departments, on the basis of their combined throughput, was 
then split between those two departments in the ratio 2:1.30 This 
change was consistent with a desire to measure the profitability 
of departments which interfaced at least partly with the market. 
The decision was made in the early 1870s to expand pig iron 
production by the construction of additional furnaces (see be-
low) and, whereas pig iron production was insufficient to meet 
the foundries' requirements in 1870, ten years later nearly half 
of the pig iron output of 61,526 tons was available for sale.31 The 
allocation of the total castings charge between the two foundries 
and the allocation of the total collieries charge between the ten 
collieries and two coke ovens was then made on a per ton ba-
sis.32 
between the Staveley Collieries and the Castings department, respectively, in the 
ratios 1:2 and 1:1. Because the term "Staveley Collieries" covered six separate 
pits, the total allocation was then shared among them on a per ton basis. 
30
 Working papers show that the tonnage figure for castings, for the purpose 
of the above allocation, was built up as follows: pig iron department — quantity 
of ironstone and limestone used plus pig iron sold; castings department — pig 
iron and sand used and castings made. This continues the logic of charging 
flows to only one department, with pig iron used to produce castings counted 
only in the latter department. Why these figures were then combined and the 
allocation instead made between castings and pig iron on a 2:1 basis is not clear, 
but it certainly affected the allocation as ironstone used was comfortably the 
largest of the relevant throughputs. 
31
 Other changes in the apport ionment of establishment charges were as 
follows: rates and taxes were identified with each major center of activity; the 
cost of the manufacture was charged entirely to castings, save what appear to be 
notional charges of £200 and £50 respectively to collieries and pig iron; one half 
of the gas works expense was charged to castings — the basis for allocating the 
other half between collieries and pig iron is impossible to discern as is the 
method of splitting law expenses among all three departments. 
32
 It is interesting to note that, despite the emphasis on producing costing 
data, there does not seem to have been quite so much concern with its reliabil-
ity. An apparent weakness was the inclusion in the department accounts of large 
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It is difficult to find any rational explanation for the alloca-
tion of establishment costs only to departments interfacing with 
the market. In circumstances where transfers were made at a 
figure designed to reflect market price, one would expect cost to 
be allocated between all operating activities in order to discover 
whether total departmental cost was covered by departmental 
revenue. It might be argued that establishment costs were not 
charged to departments transferring all their output internally 
on the grounds that such costs were unavoidable, and the essen-
tial question was whether production made a contribution to 
overall company profits. A problem with this line of argument, 
however, is that not all fixed costs were included under the 
heading of establishment charges. It might also be pointed out 
that the method adopted would have had greater logic if all 
transfers were made at cost; in such circumstances there would 
be little point in allocating to departments expenditure which 
would then be transferred, in total, to the next department down 
the line. 
The method used to value interdepartmental transfers be-
came the subject of the board's attention at a meeting held on 
November 22, 1875 [D3808, Minute Book, 1871-75]. A question 
arose as to the price charged for ironstone to the furnaces, and 
the secretary confirmed that it was charged at cost price. Fol-
lowing a discussion of which the details were not minuted, "it 
was resolved that, in future, the furnace should be debited at the 
market price so as to show if there was a gain or loss by the 
undertaking." At the next monthly board meeting, held on De-
cember 20, 1875, it was further resolved "that the system of 
book-keeping laid down by the board at its last meeting in re-
spect of the Frodingham Glebe ironstone be applied to lime, 
sand, bricks, and all other materials supplied from one depart-
ment of the company to another department as far as practi-
cable."33 
We might assume that the outcome was the production of 
more relevant data for assessment and decision making pur-
write-off's of capital expenditure from 1885 to 1900 amounting in total to 
£246,380. However, a record was maintained of such amounts written off, and it 
would presumably have been possible to interpret the calculations of depart-
mental profit and unit cost in the light of this knowledge. 
33
 We saw, above, that the lime kiln and the brickyard had previoulsy been 
treated as separate profit centers in the period 1838-41. 
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poses. And we might surmise that the downturn in profitability, 
in 1875, following four very good years focused the minds of 
management more sharply on the need for meaningful account-
ing information. The report made by the directors to the share-
holders at the end of the year contains the following passage of 
relevance in this context: 
the extraordinary inflation of the Coal and Iron trades 
must inevitably lead to very great competition in the 
future, and there is not the slightest doubt that the de-
velopment of the iron and coal trades is now far in 
excess of the requirements of the trade of the country.34 
The analysis considered so far cover periods of six months 
or a year. Evidence survives for the late-nineteenth century of 
attempts also made to monitor performance on a weekly or 
monthly basis.35 Weekly Cost Books detailing operations of indi-
vidual furnaces cover discontinuous time periods between 1885-
1933; the first was for the period November 21, 1885 to January 
3, 1891 [D1185]. There is a weekly sheet for each of the three 
furnaces then in blast which contains unit cost data broadly 
similar to that appearing in the Foundry Statements and Re-
turns Book.36 In addition, the weekly sheet shows yield data for 
individual inputs and a column for "remarks" which provided a 
record of events to help explain increases/decreases in cost/ 
profit. For example, the entry for March 27, 1886 reads: "No 2 
furnace stood 124 hours for repairs and alterations to throat. 
Blast off 5 am Monday March 22nd. Blast on 9 am Saturday 
March 27th." 
Also relevant for the purpose of monitoring performance 
was the analysis book [Sheffield City Library, SIR31] kept by the 
company's accountant, Robinson. It contains a miscellaneous 
range of calculations, records and analyzes for 1879 onwards, 
including the following items: 
* Calculations of the comparative make of pig iron taking four 
months of 1879 and five months for each of the following two 
34
 Shareholders were also warned that "profits obtained during the past year 
are due, in a great measure, to the very favourable contracts which remained 
unexecuted at the commencement of the financial year." 
35
 It is of course a possibility that financial statements covering shorter peri-
ods than six months were prepared before 1879, but that they have not survived. 
36
 One difference was the inclusion of a single round sum for establishment 
charges which began at £90 per week and was increased to £140 in June 1886 
when the number of furnaces in blast was reduced from three to two. 
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years. In the first year there were five furnaces in operation, 
in 1880 six furnaces, and in the following two years seven 
furnaces. Calculations were made of the average make per 
furnace per month and per day, presumably to enable valid 
comparisons to be made and conclusions drawn. 
* A comparison, based on a month in 1883, of the cost of coke 
used to smelt a ton of pig iron. The results were Ireland coke, 
2s 6.91d; Wells and Company's coke, 2s 1.53d and Springwell 
coke, 1s 11.61d. The conclusion reached was that Wells was 
1 9 ¾ % better than Ireland, Springwell 2 5 ¾ % better than Ire-
land and 71/3% better than Wells. 
* An analysis of activity at the new foundry where pipes and 
castings were manufactured. Statements were prepared for 
four or five-week periods, commencing the four weeks ending 
April 25, 1896 and continuing until 1900. They show the ton-
nage of pipes and castings manufactured, and cost per ton in 
respect of the following expenses: coal and iron, establish-
ment charges, haulage, wages, fuel, land and manure, carbon, 
timber, repair, sundries, stores, wrought iron, steel and brass. 
There then follows a statement which shows for various em-
ployees, the tonnage manufactured, total cost and cost per 
ton. At the bottom of the sheet total and unit cost was com-
pared with sales figures to give a profit figure. There is a 
similar analysis for the old foundry. 
ACCOUNTING DATA AND STRATEGIC 
DECISION MAKING — 1863-1900 
During the period 1863-1900, there is much evidence of the 
use of ad hoc accounting reports to help tackle pressing business 
problems. It is instructional to refer to some of these reports, as 
they provide an indication of the topics considered deserving of 
top management attention, of the use made of accounting data, 
and of strategic decisions reached which influenced the long-
term developments at Staveley. 
Soon after the Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd was in-
corporated, its board of directors realized that expenditure was 
needed both to improve the infrastructure of the company and 
to ensure its longer-term viability and position in the industry. 
Planning was difficult in the nineteenth century iron and coal 
industries, with demand fluctuating considerably in response to 
changing business conditions. It was therefore important to 
structure the business so as to achieve maximum production 
flexibility while, at the same time, balancing the needs and capa-
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bilities of the various departments. In this context, there was a 
need to operate a sufficient number of furnaces to be able to 
match those in blast with current requirements, and to have 
available a guaranteed supply of essential materials — coal, 
ironstone and coke. 
The second directors' report, for the year to June 30, 1865, 
indicates that the developmental process was already underway 
with the purchase of the North Staveley Collieries at Aston for 
£25,353, an acquisition which proved of inestimable value to the 
company. A report from Markham to the board, dated Decem-
ber 16, 1867, contained an estimate of the additional cost that 
would be required to increase the production of coal by 25% 
from the present level of 800,000 tons per annum. As the exist-
ing collieries were working at or near full capacity, Markham 
advocated three initiatives designed to achieve the desired objec-
tive: the sinking of an additional pit at Hollingwood; increased 
production at North Staveley; and a new sinking at Waterloo to 
be worked in connection with the Springwell Colliery. Markham 
then turned to an examination of the resource implications of 
any decision to expand production. The analysis identifies, in 
detail, the cost of sinking the new pit and further essential, re-
lated expenditure on colliers' cottages (it being increasingly diffi-
cult to get colliers to travel from urban centers where jobs were 
becoming more readily available) and railway wagons. The esti-
mated financial requirements were £100,000, made up of 200 
cottages at £90,600 railway wagons at £70, and the new sinking 
at £40,000 [Report, December 16, 1867, p. 7]. 
A further important strategic decision, reported by the di-
rectors in 1870, was to build two additional furnaces, making six 
in all (further increased to eight by 1874) in order to reduce the 
amount of pig iron which, as noted above, needed to be pur-
chased from outside at this time. We can infer the use of rou-
tinely generated internal costings to help reach this decision 
from the directors' observation that the company "can manufac-
ture pig iron as cheap as other firms . . . [and] . . . are of opinion 
that an increased production of pig iron will be attended with 
profitable results" [Directors' Report, 1870]. Markham's knowl-
edge of relative costs is also demonstrated by his claim that, in 
1874, the company could make pig iron as cheaply as its north 
of England competitors [Chapman, 1981, p. 78]. Later, in 1885, 
Markham maintained that "nearly all Derbyshire furnaces were 
smelting at a loss and that Staveley was one of the few that 
could show any kind of profit margin" [Ibid., p. 79]. 
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It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which cost and 
profit data for individual companies were readily available. It is 
difficult to believe that firms were comfortable with the idea of 
such information being made available to competitors. But iron 
and coal were close-knit industries at this time, with the same 
people on the boards of competing concerns (and probably 
holding significant shareholdings in each of them) and compa-
nies using the same business advizers (the services of William 
Armstrong37 and Chadwick, for example, were widely sought af-
ter). It is therefore likely to have proved difficult to prevent 
information drift, even when determined efforts were made to 
prevent this happening. For example, on February 2, 1895 
[D3808, Minute Book, 1888-95], the board "resolved that none 
of the costs of the company to be communicated by any of the 
officials to anyone without the previous consent of the board." 
Capital expenditures, once made, were then carefully moni-
tored. A report from Markham to the board, dated January 20, 
1868, re-examines an estimate of £73,000 made on August 27, 
1866 to cover a range of expenditure including new pumping 
engines for the Speedwell and Seymour pits, the development of 
the North Staveley Collieries, and the Waterloo sinking. The 
remaining work outstanding, together with revised estimates, 
indicated further necessary expenditure totaling £60,800 [p. 16]. 
Markham believed that, although the company had sufficient 
money to finance operating activities, it would be necessary to 
provide separately for the above expenditure "which cannot be 
postponed with advantage" [p. 16]. The directors' minutes for 
October 19, 1868 [D3808, Minute Book 1866-71] show that ex-
penditure was carefully monitored, with Markham explaining 
that his January estimate would not be significantly exceeded.38 
There are a number of other references to monitoring the cost of 
new projects, and the process was formalized by a board minute 
of November 24, 1891 [D3808, Minute Book 1888-95] by which 
37
 Armstrong, an engineering consultant based in Ferry Hill, Durham, was 
engaged by companies in the north east of England for a variety of business 
purposes. At Staveley, he was engaged to value the collieries and ironworks at 
the date of incorporation and to advise, subsequently, on the company's depre-
ciation policy. At Bolckow Vaughan, Armstrong was consulted on a wider range 
of matters, including cost levels. The arrangement with Armstrong entered into 
in 1869 is detailed at the directors' meeting held on 21 April [directors' minute 
book number 2]. 
38
 The then current position was that £17,170 had been spent and he esti-
mated that £46,250 was required to complete the work. 
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"The secretary was instructed to keep a book for presentation to 
the board of all authorised expenditures, the estimated cost and 
the actual expenditure." 
In addition to estimates of the cost of new investments, 
there is evidence of formal attempts made to evaluate the im-
pact of a new scheme on the company's financial position. In his 
report dated December 16, 1867, for example, Markham in-
formed the board that a new blowing engine was being con-
structed. His preoccupation with financial stability may be in-
ferred from the use of the payback method of capital investment 
appraisal to evaluate the financial implications of this project: 
"Even in the present depressed state of trade I believe the addi-
tional furnace that has been put up will save the Company [in] 
the first year of its working one half of the present outlay of 
capital that has been incurred" [p. 9]. It appears that the rapid 
recovery of the investment was possible because the company 
was able to manufacture iron at a price 10s less than they could 
buy it outside [Ibid.]. 
A board minute dated September 21, 1868 [D3808, Minute 
Book 1866-71] focuses on the financial implications of a pro-
posal to change operating procedures. Under the heading "Blast 
furnaces gas, reduction in production of iron," Markham re-
ported that workers "have taken gas from two of the furnaces 
and are burning it under the stoves and three boilers." Further, 
that results 
so far appear to establish the fact that the production of 
iron from the furnaces is materially reduced, and that 
the quantity of coal used in the furnaces has increased. 
A statement has been prepared showing that the make 
of the furnaces monthly since number three furnace 
was blown in, and a note made when the gas was taken 
off from each of the furnaces and the results appear to 
be unsatisfactory. The make-up of iron for the past 
month has been at the rate of £2. 12. 11¼ per ton. The 
coal and ironstone have both been charged at reduced 
rates as compared with the corresponding period of last 
year, consequently the cost compared with the other 
period has materially increased. 
The value of the small coals to the boilers is com-
paratively small, and the fact that we have made our 
iron at about 48s per ton with a considerable portion of 
our own stone, renders it essential that the whole of the 
question, should be examined with great care. 
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A further illustration of the use of accounting data for stra-
tegic decision making is implicit in the following entry in the 
directors' minutes under the heading "Blast furnaces." Markham 
reported on and "referred to the stock of pig iron on hand: 
owing to the unremunerative prices to be obtained and the de-
creased demand in the present state of the trade, he considered 
it advisable to blow some of the furnaces out in preference to 
increasing the stock, which was chiefly 'forge', as he did not 
think it would be sold for some time to come owing to the 
change going on in the trade" [D3808, Minute Book 1866-71, 
June 23, 1879]. 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
The Role of Accounting 
Questions which we attempt to explore further here are, 
who used cost accounting data for decision making, for what 
purpose, and was it relevant? The dominant personality at 
Staveley between 1863 and his death in 1888 was Charles 
Markham. He was recruited by Pochin from the Midland Rail-
way Company where he was one of its senior engineers. As was 
common in the iron and coal industry, the Managing Director 
(more often carrying the title General Manager at this time) 
produced a monthly report for the board. No copies of those 
prepared at Staveley have survived, and we can only speculate as 
to their accounting content based on the few references made to 
Markham's reports in the board minutes. 
Of most interest in the present context is that, in response 
to a request made on February 17, 1868 [D3808, Minute Book 
1866-71], Markham presented the board [March 16, 1868] with 
a statement showing the comparative cost of getting coal, and of 
the sales and profit for each of the four years ending June 1867. 
We do not know whether this was a regular occurrence, but lack 
of board comment on such matters suggests that it was not. We 
therefore conclude that at Staveley the day-to-day management 
of the works was the responsibility of Markham and his deputies 
who headed individual departments. 
Turning to decisions of a strategic character, which usually 
involved financial outlay, we find the board members more 
heavily involved, although it is doubtful whether they did much 
more than agree with Markham's conclusions. The archives sug-
gest that cash flow was the principal concern when making stra-
tegic decisions, with management possibly convinced that a new 
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investment would prove profitable provided the current level of 
efficiency could be maintained for an expanded output. Having 
negotiated long-term leases at the time of incorporation, there 
was a determination to make the investment work and, provided 
financial stability could be maintained, management remained 
confident that the company could outperform its rivals. The fact 
that the company was incorporated at what proved to be a low 
capitalization [Edwards and Boyns, 1994, p. 1156] no doubt 
helped in this direction. 
Concerning the nature and purpose of the routinely pre-
pared reports, we find at Staveley between 1838-1900, in com-
mon with the position between 1690-1783, the complete integra-
tion of the cost and financial records; the use of transfer prices 
to measure departmental profits; and the use of unit costs, ana-
lyzed in detail, for comparative purposes both between activities 
and over time.39 This type of information may be compared and 
contrasted with that found by Johnson [1972] at the Lyman 
Mills textile company for the 1850s where an integrated cost and 
financial accounting system was in use, but where it was princi-
pally concerned with building up figures for the cost of produc-
tion. Johnson [1972, p. 474] concluded that such calculations 
were clearly being prepared for management looking "inwards 
on the shop, and not outwards on the industry." The basic aim 
was to control internal plant operations; for example, to gauge 
the physical productivity of the mill operatives, to assess the 
impact on operations of changes in plant layout and to control 
the receipt and use of raw cotton. That is, the emphasis was on 
cost identification and control. 
The cost accounting data at Staveley were adequate to pro-
vide an input for these kinds of decisions, but also others. In 
particular, departmental profit data provided management with 
the information required to assess the relative profitability of 
different collieries, furnaces, foundries and ironstone pits; to 
enable management to discover whether, and the extent to 
which, total business costs were covered by revenues; to reach 
closure decisions; and to identify the financial advantage to be 
gained by squeezing out the middle man.40 It should also be 
noted that the detail appearing in the Foundry Statements and 
39Although there were these broad similarities, the amount of costing data 
generated increased significantly over time. 
40
 The inclusion of depreciation and imputed interest, from time to time, is 
further evidence of an awareness of the need to cover total costs in the long run. 
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Returns Book 1856-1879 would have allowed management to 
examine movements in individual costs. In other words, total 
cost per unit was calculated, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that management was preoccupied with this single measure as 
the basis for performance assessment or decision making. Ele-
ments of direct cost per ton could be used to monitor efficiency, 
while the careful observation of movements in fixed establish-
ment costs per ton would presumably underline the advantages 
of working at full capacity. 
The lack of surviving evidence of the use made of routinely 
prepared costing data is disappointing but, perhaps, unsur-
prising. The questions which such evidence would have been 
expected to illuminate; e.g., the degree of waste and inefficiency, 
were matters principally for the consideration of managers 
lower down the managerial hierarchy. We might expect that, in 
circumstances free from any constitutional obligation to retain a 
formal record of what was said (such as the obligation to record 
the meetings of boards of directors in robust minute books), 
communication of information was often by word of mouth or 
in a written form less likely to have stood the test of time. Never-
theless, we can see from evidence occasionally recorded in the 
minute books that Markham was fully familiar with the cost of 
operations both at Staveley and elsewhere. 
We are perhaps able to gain further insight into the purpose 
of Staveley's accounting system from contemporary assessments 
made by two dist inguished scholars . According to Rober t 
Hamilton (1788), Professor of Philosophy in the Marischal Col-
lege, Aberdeen, "When a person is engaged in several branches 
of manufacturer, whether on different materials, or on the same 
materials through several successive stages, he should keep his 
books in such a manner as to exhibit the gain or loss on each" 
[quoted in Solomons, 1952, p.6]. While, according to Charles 
Babbage [1832, p. 203], Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at 
the University of Cambridge from 1828 to 1839: 
The great competition introduced by machinery, and 
the application of the principle of the sub-division of 
labour, render it necessary for each producer to be con-
tinually on the watch, to discover improved methods by 
which the cost of the article he manufacturers may be 
reduced; and, with this view, it is of great importance to 
know the precise expense of every process, as well as of 
the wear and tear of machinery which is due to it . . . 
One of the first advantages which suggests itself as 
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likely to arise from a correct analysis of the expense of 
the several processes of any manufacture, is the indica-
tion which it would furnish of the course in which im-
provement should be directed. 
It is clear that the system at Staveley was capable of satisfying 
these kinds of priorities fairly well. 
The Process of Accounting Innovation 
In The Visible Hand [1977], Chandler's survey of the extant 
literature led him to conclude that, Springfield Armory and the 
railways aside, U.S. accounting systems were little concerned 
with costing matters until the 1850s when, as noted above, man-
agers at the Lyman Mills pioneered important new develop-
ments. We have seen that Hoskin and Macve have since re-
examined the significance of developments at the Springfield 
Armory in the light of "the West Point connection" and con-
cluded that they paved the way for revolutionizing accountabil-
ity based on the measu remen t of the product ivi ty of the 
workforce. 
By the 1880s, considerable cost accounting progress had 
undoubtedly been made in the U.S., and cost sheets prepared for 
the Carnegie steel company were found to be far more detailed 
and accurate than the system of cost controls in the leading 
textile companies and elsewhere [Chandler, 1977, p. 268]. Of 
relevance for the Hoskin and Macve thesis is the observation 
made by a contemporary worker at Carnegie that "The men felt 
and often remarked that the eyes of the company were always 
on them through the books" [quoted Ibid., p . 268]. But there 
were other, and wider, applications for the accounting system 
which, Chandler [Ibid.] judged, included "the evaluation of the 
performance of departmental managers, foremen, and men"; "to 
check the quality and mix of raw materials"; "to evaluate im-
provements in process and in product"; "to make decisions on 
developing by-products"; to price "nonstandardized items"; and 
to help decide whether or not to "accept a contract". Our study 
of the accounting system operated at Staveley shows that, in 
Britain, costing developments started far earlier and in certain 
important respects went beyond those revealed by Johnson's 
[1972] examination of the Lyman Mills records even if, by 1880, 
they had not achieved the sophistication of data generated at 
Carnegie. Nevertheless, while the system operated at Staveley 
from 1690 to 1900 exhibits substantial continuity, it also exhib-
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its changes made in response to new business and organiza-
tional circumstances. 
These findings also require us to modify the interpretation 
placed on what Solomons [1952, p. 17] has termed "The Costing 
Renaissance." The starting date of the Staveley records, 1690, 
predates the first known text on double entry bookkeeping 
which gives consideration to tracking internal flows of goods 
[Collins, 1697]. This pioneering text was followed by just a 
handful of publications [cited in Solomons, 1952, pp. 4-17; 
Edwards, 1989, pp. 313-14] over a period of almost 200 years 
which considered the implications of adapting techniques devel-
oped for a mercantile economy to industrial needs. Neverthe-
less, industrial concerns such as Staveley were using costing 
techniques and developing them as the need arose. Thus 
Solomons' suggestion that "to a great extent they [the authors 
cited] were only rediscovering ideas that were becoming of prac-
tical importance for the first time, but which could certainly have 
been found, though perhaps in an undeveloped state, in earlier 
works" [1952, p. 17, emphasis added] needs to be elaborted, 
since it is becoming increasingly clear that the rediscovery sug-
gested by Solomons was, in fact, confined to the literature. 
The evolution of Staveley's cost accounting system, com-
mencing seven years before the publication of Collins' text, can 
be seen as a perfectly natural process which may have been 
replicated elsewhere in Britain as well as in other countries of 
the world. In such cases there was a need for neither a "redis-
covery" nor a "renaissance" in cost accounting; the managers 
were convinced of the value of costing information throughout. 
This demand/response explanation for accounting development 
is recognized as a driving force also in the U.S., where railway 
managers were aware of the need for a constant flow of infor-
mation as a prerequisite for efficient railroad operation. This 
brought a revolution in accounting; more precisely, it 
contributed substantially to the emergence of account-
ing out of bookkeeping. The techniques of I tal ian 
double-entry bookkeeping generated the data needed, 
but these data, required in far larger quantities and in 
more systematic form, were then subjected to types of 
analysis that were new. In sum, to meet the needs of 
managing the first modern business enterprise, manag-
ers of large American railroads during the 1850's and 
1860's invented nearly all the basic techniques of mod-
ern accounting [Chandler, 1977, p. 109]. 
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We do not claim that Staveley's system met all the managers ' 
financial information requirements,41 nor even that it was as 
good as it should have been. For example, we find no explicit 
evidence of the employment of standards or "norms". Neither 
have we been able to tie down the method of overhead appor-
tionment in all cases. However, we do find evidence of an en-
deavor to establish causal relationships (what are referred to 
today as "cost drivers"), while the use of "norms" based on trial 
runs has been discovered e lsewhere in far ear l ier t imes 
[Edwards, Hammersley and Newell, 1990], and we might specu-
late that similar experiments provided yardsticks at Staveley. In 
other words, the detailed cost and yield calculations may have 
benefitted from comparisons with norms as well as between 
time and activity. 
The findings from this research go beyond the question of 
the type of the calculations made and their usefulness for the 
purpose of decision making. They also suggest the need to re-
examine the nature of the development of cost accounting and 
to incorporate in that re-examination a recognition of the fact 
that similar explanations may well not apply to developments in 
both Britain and the United States due, for example, to the dif-
ferential circumstances of industrial development, particularly 
the fact that industrialization occurred earlier and at a steadier 
rate in Britain, and that the labor market possibly exhibited 
different characteristics in the two countries. 
Attention must also be paid to changes in business condi-
tions, and their impact assessed. The circumstances at Staveley 
over a period in excess of 300 years demonstrate important simi-
larities and dissimilarities. The works comprised an integrated 
business operation throughout, with ironstone pits, furnaces 
41
 The problems that growing industrialization produced for industry were 
listed by Edwards (1937), including the following which, one imagines, would 
have worried management at Staveley — the need to control, supervise and pay 
large numbers of employees; the need for cost and output details relating to 
various processes as a check on waste and inefficiency; the need to know prime 
costs so that decisions about price-cutting could be made when demand was 
slack. Edwards also commented on the importance of interest as an element of 
total fixed cost with it being estimated that, by about 1833, interest accounted 
for about one quarter of a cost of bar iron. We might add that management 
would also have been interested in total costs to assess the extent to which these 
were covered by prices and to judge the company's ability to survive and prosper 
in the long run. (This matter did not receive emphasis from Edwards who was a 
determined advocate of marginal cost and a severe critic of the arbitrary appor-
tionment of overheads.) 
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and foundries' common features. Important changes occurred 
over time, however, which included the following: charcoal pur-
chased from outside producers was replaced as a source of fuel 
by coal supplied from collieries owned by the company; the 
production of pots and pans for domestic use was replaced by 
cast iron pipes for a business and municipal market; and the 
slitting mill used in earlier times to convert bar-iron into nails 
was closed down. The scale of operations, of course, increased 
enormously with pig-iron production rising from approximately 
500 tons in the 1750s to 132,000 tons in 1900, while coal pro-
duction increased from zero to 1.8m tons per annum, the bulk 
of which was sold to contribute the major proportion of the 
company's reported profit at the later date. Judged against this 
latter criterion, we can conclude that the accounting system at 
Staveley displayed a high degree of continuity and, with little 
evident difficulty, was adapted to meet perceived management 
requirements in an evolving organizational structure which pro-
duced massive growth in the scale and scope of operations and 
numbers employed. 
The Need for Further Research 
What is the significance of this study for the present debate 
concerning the nature of management accounting development? 
On the whole, we see it as providing greater support for eco-
nomic rationalist rather than Foucauldian-based explanations. 
This does not mean that we disagree with conclusions reached 
concerning the importance of events at West Point and the 
Springfield Armory for the development of managerialism, nor 
that "the development of cost and management accounting [in 
the U.S.A.] might be traced to the influence of the engineering 
graduates of the military academy at West Point" [Hoskin and 
Macve, 1988, pp. 37-8].42 However, we do question whether the 
case made by Hoskin and Macve is in certain respects over-
stated, and whether they have underestimated the significance 
of events elsewhere for the development of management ac-
counting. For example, is there sufficiently strong evidence to 
justify their claim that the "birth of accounting out of book-
keeping" in terms of the disciplinary effect on workers [1988, 
p.68] is sustainable? The uses to which accounting information 
42
 We have noted in this paper that Britain looked to the U.S.A in 1950 for 
leadership in the development of management accounting systems. 
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is put are many and various, including pricing, preparing esti-
mates, measuring the profitability of departments and products, 
calculating the yield from material inputs, identifying waste and 
pilferage, assessing labor efficiency and helping management 
make investment decisions. These seem to go far beyond con-
cerns with "human accountability" [1988, p.37] which is the 
essence of the Hoskin and Macve thesis. 
We have shown that costing information capable of illumi-
nating many of the above management problems was produced 
at Staveley and, in a few cases, we have been able to cite clear 
evidence of the way in which it was used in relation thereto. We 
therefore conclude that Staveley's accounting function, despite 
the lack of explicit attention to human accountability, com-
prised a system of management accounting within the definition 
of that term laid down in the 1950 Productivity Report.43 Never-
theless, we would agree that the reasons for the apparent failure 
to impose labor norms and measure deviations therefrom is a 
matter which requires further investigation since it may possibly 
be a factor which helps explain Britain's relative economic de-
cline after 1870.44 Whereas systems of scientific management 
were adopted rapidly in the United States under the influence of 
Frederick Taylor and others, it is not until the 1920s that we find 
evidence of them being introduced in Britain [Littler, 1982] or of 
any attention being devoted to standard costing in the British 
literature [Stelling, 1924; Renold, 1927].45 The existing evidence 
suggests that, during the period covered by this paper, British 
management preferred to rely on some combination of subcon-
tracting, piece rates and direct supervision to achieve adequate 
labor efficiency, and the question of whether British manage-
ment either considered it desirable or practical to impose disci-
plinary control through norms is a topic worthy of investigation. 
At Staveley, concern with waste and efficiency, to the extent that 
this extended to the performance of labor, appears to have relied 
on observations of changes in the wages of different categories 
of labor per unit of output. The extent to which this served as a 
43
 Comparable wordings can be found in modern management accounting 
texts. 
44
 Current knowledge on this issue in the British context remains limited. 
Certainly, it does not seem sufficient to justify Locke's [1979a; 1979b] conclusion 
that inferior accounting technology was a significant factor explaining Britain's 
poor relative performance. 
45
 Progress was even slower in France with standard costing not receiving 
widespread adoption until the 1960s. 
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spur to action is largely hidden from researchers into this 
archive and must await the discovery of more revealing primary 
data. 
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